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Workshop report – International workshop 
on public ownership of  energy 
Date: Thursday 10 May – Friday 11 May 2018. Location: Edinburgh. Organised by: University 
of Edinburgh Heat and the City research group (www.heatandthecity.org.uk)  
With the UK Labour party, Scottish National Party (and Government), and Plaid Cymru all 
proposing creation of publicly owned energy companies (POECs), this two-day workshop  
responded to the re-emerging European debate about public and private sectors roles in the 
economy. Academics and practitioners discussed the evidence and arguments for and against 
public ownership of energy networks, power generation, gas supply, energy retailing and energy 
services. Energy systems and clean energy are fundamental to economy and society, but there are 
questions about whether ownership matters to performance, costs, efficiency and carbon 
intensity. In Germany many, but not all, municipalities are bringing energy networks back into 
public ownership, with envisaged public benefits from control over types of investment, pricing 
and revenues. In Denmark the relation between commercial operation of municipal energy 
companies and the political objectives of their owners are debated and contested. UK opinion 
surveys find majority support for public ownership, but what should the objectives and business 
structures of any public enterprises be?  
This report summarises workshop discussions, which were held under the Chatham House Rule. 
The Workshop Programme and presentations are available on the Heat and the City website. 
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1 Introduction 
The report reflects on workshop themes, providing insight into the challenges and issues of 
public ownership. It does not draw conclusions about the desirability or effectiveness of public 
ownership as a solution to energy policy objectives. This reflects the diversity of opinion at the 
workshop, but is also a consequence of high-level features of the debate which we draw out here 
before engaging with specifics. 
• There were divergent views on the pros and cons of public ownership, with some 
incommensurable arguments made. Technical, organisational and economic arguments 
are important, but the debate also concerns political beliefs and values. For example, 
there was much debate about the instrumental value of public ownership in terms of 
energy cost and environmental impact, but also discussion of ethical issues including the 
democratic value of public participation in energy planning.  
• Views are often shaped by ‘deep-seated’ beliefs and assumptions concerning, for 
instance, the relative efficiency of public or private companies or the capacities of local 
authorities to act entrepreneurially; supporting evidence is either limited or absent.  
• The complexity of energy systems and transitions to low carbon energy may contribute 
to the absence of clear-cut evidence to support either direction of argument. For 
example, there was disagreement about whether private energy systems are subject to any 
failures or dysfunctions; if there are areas of failure, are these attributable to ownership 
per se, or could they be resolved through more effective regulation and policy. Lastly, 
would public ownership necessarily be any better. 
2 Forms of public ownership 
Proposals and working examples of POECs covered different scales and activities including: 
supply companies competing in liberalised markets; municipal gas and electricity distribution 
networks and district heating systems; transfer of assets and infrastructure to public ownership, 
and public shareholdings in major European utilities. It was noted there are more examples of 
city scale (or smaller) POECs than national scale in part because establishing new ownership 
models at a larger scale is more challenging.  
2.1 Publicly owned energy supply companies in the UK 
UK publicly owned energy suppliers are small local authority companies (such as Bristol Energy 
and Robin Hood Energy), but there is also a proposal for a Scottish Government owned energy 
company1, and a similar proposal in Wales2.  
Retailing energy was described as primarily an information business, comprising a complex web 
of customer-facing issues (metering, pricing, billing, load profiles and forecast demand) and 
interaction with the wider energy system (trading, balancing, and system use charges). As such, 
there was some suggestion that public ownership would give public authorities better access to 
aspects of this system-relevant information, enabling them to better target interventions (such as 
fuel poverty measures) or plan system change.  
There were discussions about what public energy suppliers can do differently to private 
companies. Some of these activities build on the information assets of supply companies, while 
                                                 
1 EY, 2018. Publicly Owned Energy Company: Strategic Outline Case (SOC) (Report prepared for the Scottish 
Government). http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00533962.pdf  
2 Plaid Cymru, 2017. Ynni Cymru: Power for Wales. http://www2.partyof.wales/ynnicymru. Subsequent 
stakeholder workshops, however, concluded entry into the supply market was not appropriate for Welsh 
government (Darnton, A., 2017. An Energy Company for Wales? Stakeholder Engagement Events Summary 
Report. Welsh Government Decarbonisation and Energy Division. 
http://gov.wales/topics/environmentcountryside/energy/publications/an-energy-company-for-wales/) 
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others are integrated with customer relations. For example, Welsh Government’s early discussion 
of a public supply company incorporated bulk procurement of domestic scale equipment (such 
as solar panels and batteries), a hire-purchase model for energy efficient appliances, and an R&D 
division that would certify the performance of new domestic equipment. Similarly some 
responses to Scottish Government’s Energy Strategy consultation suggested a public supplier 
could support deployment of low carbon heat technologies, which are not being deployed at 
significant scale in current markets.  
The relationship between public retail supply companies and energy efficiency policies was also 
touched on. A vertically integrated publicly owned model, it was argued, could balance low 
carbon investment across the energy system, rationally appraising the relative merits of reducing 
demand vs investing in supply in a way that unbundled models cannot. There is however 
potential for conflict of interest, with public ownership of supply motivating public authorities to 
maintain levels of demand. Alternative models, such as supplying energy services rather than 
energy, could in theory resolve this tension. There was some suggestion that public ownership 
would support a transition to energy service models through patient finance, and greater trust 
and willingness of households to enter longer term contracts with a publicly owned company. 
These assertions would need to be tested in practice. 
2.2 Public Ownership of energy distribution networks 
There was some discussion whether ownership of gas networks is an asset or a liability to public 
authorities. For example, UK policy scenarios for 2050 envisage a reduction in the number of 
buildings using gas. This raised a question about whether public ownership might afford a more 
orderly wind-up of parts of the gas network and better coordination with roll-out of alternative 
heating. Against this view, if parts of the gas network are to become stranded assets then transfer 
to public ownership is not economically attractive. 
The ‘public profit’ arising from public ownership of networks includes facilitation of public 
policy objectives. Some participants suggested this might be quite limited, particularly for 
electricity distribution, in the absence of wider reform. This is because the activities of network 
operators are constrained by regulation, leaving little opportunity for a public owner to do things 
differently. This perspective came from Germany, and is dependent on the details of the 
regulatory model.  
Established district heating systems, particularly in Germany, may be more attractive prospects 
for public ownership than gas or electricity, as they comprise generation (often CHP) as well as 
distribution infrastructure, and are less constrained by national network regulations. For the UK, 
public ownership of district heating could be a route to resolving issues that have arisen in more 
mature heat markets and likely to affect the UK in future. Heat networks concentrate bulky 
infrastructure and energy facilities in cities, forming a catalyst and focal point for local energy 
politics. Extension and interconnection of networks brings higher transaction costs where 
ownership is fragmented. Users also distrust commercial operators of natural monopoly 
networks, suspecting them of exploitation and finding company financial accounts opaque. 
2.3 Synergies between energy and other local authority activities 
Discussion of municipal approaches to energy highlighted various synergies with other local 
authority activities. For example, local authority housing services and relationships with other 
Registered Social Landlords can support company growth by tying in energy services (such as 
smart meter installation) with wider maintenance, and agreeing default supply arrangements 
when social housing units are void. Robin Hood Energy spends very little on marketing because 
council ownership generates considerable social and media publicity. Adaptation of existing 
systems and structures to minimise costs was reported to be common across a wide variety of 
local authority energy projects. While this can enable the establishment of local energy, it may 
also bring risks that UK municipal companies are restricted to specific niches. 
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Similarly, there are examples of German municipalities using or adapting existing arms-length 
company structures for POECs. Hamburg Energie is integrated with the municipal water 
company. As well as reducing setup and administration costs, this approach means the energy 
company can supply the water company directly without having to compete for an open tender 
(see section 3.1), giving some stability to its market position. 
2.4 Contemporary public ownership structures  
A recurrent theme was the relationship between ownership and governance, and how this is 
shaped by the organisation and regulation of POECs. Critiques of public ownership that focus 
on opaque governance and politically driven operational decisions do not transfer directly to 
contemporary practice, where such companies tend to have greater autonomy from their owners 
than in the past. For example, Danish municipalities historically ran district heating systems as 
in-house operations, but since 2002 have been required to separate district heating accounts 
from those of the wider municipality. In response most of them established separate municipal 
energy companies. More generally POECs operating in European liberalised markets have 
reformed their structures, including flotation on stock markets, and introduced accountability 
mechanisms which keep POECs at ‘arms-length’ from their owners. Benefits of such ‘arms-
length’ relationships include ring-fencing of risk (shielding council budgets) and revenues 
(supporting reinvestment). 
The arms-length structure, however, limits alignment between company activities and owner 
objectives. For example, in the past (pre-privatisation) although the Hamburg Government 
owned 75% of the city’s energy company3, an incoming political administration found it was not 
possible to stop planned investment in nuclear power. Contemporary UK energy companies 
owned by local authorities can also lack the voice in local policy and energy debates which they 
would have if they integrated into council structures.  
Differing perspectives were presented on the pros and cons of independent regulation as either a 
complement, or alternative, to public ownership. Independent regulation ensured scrutiny and 
prevention of vested interests (whether public or private bodies). Against independent regulation 
were arguments that decisions made by regulators lacked democratic accountability. It was 
claimed that the British energy regulator (Ofgem) has been captured by the six major energy 
companies it regulates (the ‘Big Six’). The Norwegian company Statoil was cited as an example of 
a POEC being made democratically accountable through oversight and scrutiny processes (such 
as dedicated parliamentary committees) while maintaining its arms-length company form. 
3 Challenges to establishing POECs 
3.1 Liberalisation 
The UK market was criticised as a ‘travesty of a market’ by one participant, citing high entry 
barriers, the failure of the market to send adequate investment signals and increasing volumes of 
‘out of market’ generation (that is, receiving payment by a mechanism other than competitive 
markets, such as government subsidy). Others noted that rates of switching between suppliers by 
consumers remain low. Furthermore, it was argued that across Europe the layering of market-
based capacity mechanisms over renewable support has increased transaction costs. Unbundling 
was criticised as both creating inefficiency by reducing scope for coordination and increasing 
risks faced by suppliers and generators which in turn push costs up by raising financing costs. 
The latter effect may be less significant in the UK given the vertical reintegration of generation 
and supply that produced the ‘Big Six’ companies that dominate the UK market. 
The existence of the Big Six in the UK was identified as a challenge to independent energy 
supply companies, whether publicly or privately owned. It was suggested the Big Six exert 
                                                 
3 The remaining 25% of shares were held by individuals, predominantly company employees. 
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considerable market power and would be able to undermine new suppliers by pushing wholesale 
electricity prices upward. Not all participants agreed that continued dominance of retail markets 
was a viable strategy for the Big Six. Some noted low profit margins and suggested the proposed 
merger between SSE and npower reflects difficulties in this market. However, it was also noted 
that the Competition and Markets Authority is concerned that the merger would create 
unacceptable market power.  
It was also argued small suppliers face a number of further disadvantages in energy markets 
structured around large suppliers. These include network codes (some of which were claimed to 
be anachronistic) and the fact that many large organisations require their suppliers to exceed a 
size threshold which locks small companies out. 
Other challenges to POEC proposals stemming from liberalisation were noted. Constraints on 
State Aid and procurement rules limit what public authorities can do through ownership. One 
example was the recent award by Bristol City Council of its energy supply contract to a 
commercial supplier rather than the supply company it owned, based on a commercial offer 
0.6% cheaper than Bristol Energy’s. Procurement rules require the council to issue an open 
tender for its energy supply. Some suggested that intelligent use of procurement specifications 
could nevertheless be a means of achieving public objectives with POECs, for example by 
specifying criteria such as local benefit, but examples from Germany highlighted that this can be 
limited. Some German municipalities have tried to ‘remunicipalise’ distribution networks by 
adopting criteria in concession tenders that POECs are better placed to meet, but in some cases 
this has prompted challenge from commercial companies who dispute the legality of these 
criteria.  
3.2 Costs of public ownership 
The costs of compensating private owners of energy assets transferred into public ownership has 
generated wildly varying cost estimates, from a few billion to hundreds of billions of pounds. 
Differing estimates arise from adopting different valuation principles. These include valuing 
companies based on either their share price, or the regulated value of their assets, or the 
regulated value minus debt4. Whether shareholders should be compensated for future profit also 
affects valuation. It was argued that, were transfer to public ownership to take place in the UK, 
the UK Parliament would be legally entitled to set a price of its choosing. In principle paying 
below economic value could be justified on grounds of economic justice.  
4 Advantages claimed for public ownership 
4.1 Finance 
A recurring argument put forward in favour of public ownership was the ability of states to 
borrow money at low interest rates. While State Aid rules restrict how this finance can support 
POECs, it was suggested that the ability of public authorities to recover investment over long 
periods, and their willingness to accept low returns on equity mean POECs can invest where 
private companies are unwilling. Indeed, it was suggested that Hamburg Energie, a publicly 
owned energy supplier with investments in generation, was able to rapidly expand renewables in 
Hamburg by ‘scooping up’ projects that fell below private investors’ hurdle rates. 
In long running debates around both energy and public-private partnership contracts, the higher 
cost of private finance is set against efficiency gains argued to arise from private sector 
involvement. However, during the workshop this position was questioned, with studies across a 
range of sectors finding no evidence to support a general distinction between public and private 
                                                 
4 Under this scenario existing debt would be transferred to the Government along with the assets. The Government 
would initially pay the private owner the regulated asset value minus debt, but over the longer term would pay the 
debt down, either via POEC revenues or public finances. 
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company efficiency. The Scottish water industry was presented as an example where significant 
efficiency savings had been made through a reorganisation of public ownership: merging 
separate water companies into a single (publicly owned) organisation produced scale and scope 
efficiencies that contributed to a 40% reduction in operating expenditure. UK municipal 
companies have made cost savings by exploiting synergies with other local authority activities or 
assets (see section 0), and by reducing expenditure relative to private sector counterparts. An 
example was given of a municipal company paying lower salaries and offering fewer employee 
perks (such as company cars), though it was noted this can make recruitment difficult. 
Specific criticism of private sector financing models concerned high rates of leverage – private 
utilities taking on large levels of debt. A question was raised whether an economic shock could 
lead to one or more large private energy utility becoming insolvent. An analogy was drawn with 
the privatised water industry in England where levels of debt have grown to about the same level 
as the total dividend paid out since privatisation. However, different perspectives on this point 
were advanced. For some excessive profit-taking and financial precariousness were general 
characteristics of privatised utilities. For others these failings were the fault of regulation: if 
regulatory techniques maximise incentives for profit, then companies will act accordingly. 
However, views differed on whether private companies would be willing to invest under a 
regulatory model that did not incentivise profit maximisation. 
4.2 Decision making 
Decisions made by private energy companies were criticised as ‘financialised’ – focussed on 
maximising financial value to the detriment of wider social and environmental objectives. As a 
specific example it was claimed publicly owned district heating companies are willing to invest in 
network expansion to create opportunities for new supply even when the commercial case is 
weak or uncertain; by contrast private companies require certainty (or underwriting) of 
connections before they will invest. More generally various participants cited public objectives 
(or ‘public profit’) as shaping decisions made by POECs willing to accept lower returns in 
exchange for meeting policy objectives. 
Some historical examples of poor decision making by POECs were also noted. For example, 
between 1994 and 2002 the water industry in Scotland was organised as three publicly owned 
companies covering different geographical areas. As public companies they were able to keep 
prices low by using public finance, but the political sensitivity of price meant companies also 
took additional cost-cutting measures. They delayed investment in environmental performance 
and increased debt (even borrowing to pay interest on existing debt), avoiding increased charges 
in the near term, but storing problems for the longer term. The example highlights the risk that 
public ownership can incentivise poor management. This was not considered an inevitability, 
since the existing Scottish publicly owned water company, it was claimed, has not kept prices 
artificially low or deferred necessary investment. In part, it was argued, this is because it is 
scrutinised by an independent regulator, and in part because the harmonisation of prices across 
Scotland contributed to depoliticisation, enabling these to be set at a sustainable level. 
It was suggested that the technological strategy in the UK’s former nationalised electricity 
industry was a product of  capture by engineering interests who pursued their preferred 
technologies to the exclusion of potentially more cost effective alternatives. Recognition that 
national ownership had in the past created an unaccountable power centre led current 
proponents of public ownership to argue for a multiplicity of public companies at a range of 
scales and with different forms.  
4.3 Localism 
Greater local control of energy systems, particularly systems with a high level of public 
ownership, was associated with a number of benefits. From the local community’s perspective 
retention of energy payments strengthens the local economy. At a local level, coordination across 
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networks and with local authority policies were suggested to be more achievable. For example a 
French municipal operator was able to implement smart grid innovations, connect renewable 
energy and coordinate these with investments in energy efficiency. In the UK it was suggested 
that local authority supply companies can support local generation by offering power purchase 
agreements which would not interest large commercial suppliers. A further virtue attributed to 
local control was more scope for transparency in decision making, though it was argued this is 
not an inevitable consequence of public ownership. European experience of local public 
ownership underlined the importance of independent oversight, with examples cited of political 
corruption and exploitation of monopoly assets arising in the absence of regulation. 
Balanced against arguments in favour of greater localism were arguments about the benefits of 
scale. Scale was suggested to bring a number of economies: avoiding duplicated effort and 
resources, favourable terms in large-scale procurement of equipment, access to lower cost 
finance and capacity to bear industrial risk. However, it was suggested that smart meters could 
reduce specific scale advantages, including the absorption by large energy suppliers of risks 
arising from inaccurate end-user metering and difficulties anticipating load profiles. Other 
arguments centred on the scale over which system costs, particularly fixed costs, are shared. 
Again, the Scottish water industry was raised as an example with per-connection costs varying 
hugely between rural and urban areas, but these being shared evenly across all users. In France 
debate about whether locally owned electricity networks should be locally operated or let as 
concessions to the national public operator5 include distributional questions, with the benefits of 
localism to local economies set against the benefits of a financially strong national champion and 
the sharing of costs as an expression of national solidarity. In addition to scale arguments, 
discussion of the French example highlighted that the public sector is not a homogeneous entity 
with unified purpose. It can comprise competing interests, with potential tensions between large 
scale public ownership as a route to better coordination across a country, versus small scale 
public ownership as a route to local control. 
Challenges to municipal energy companies in the UK are associated with relationships between 
local and central government. These include: misalignment of local and national objectives and 
priorities; the power of central government to shape conditions for local energy (for example, by 
setting financial incentives or recruiting local government to its programmes); reductions in local 
government funding by central government; and a degree of scepticism at central government 
level of the capacity and entrepreneurialism of local authorities. However, it was also noted that 
a powerful discourse of devolution is shared across governance levels in the UK, and that some 
cities, such as Greater Manchester, were attempting to direct City Deal investment toward 
energy.  
One prospective model suggested for the UK was the transfer of existing assets to public 
ownership under the principle of subsidiarity, with ownership of energy networks disaggregated 
and passed down to communities. As the first step in this approach would be to first take 
existing regional networks into public ownership it was described as ‘top-down creation of 
bottom-up control’. Devolving control to local communities resonated with EU proposals to 
support creation of Local Energy Communities integrating local electricity generation and 
consumption. There was some debate about what such communities would look like, based on 
doubt about the appetite of the UK public to engage directly with public ownership, and 
whether more bottom-up control could in practice be created from the top. The greater 
opportunity of wealthy communities to invest in ‘community energy’ projects was noted as 
foreshadowing a risk that only wealthier areas would have the resources needed to take control 
of local grids. 
                                                 
5 Enedis, a subsidiary of EDF 
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4.4 Distribution of economic resources 
Tensions between localising energy economies and sharing costs across society were just one 
distributional issue discussed. Proponents argued that public ownership could be a direct route 
to redistributing wealth and income, and that investment returns effected an ongoing transfer of 
wealth from the population to private shareholders, particularly because returns to private capital 
are higher than the returns taken under public ownership. The example of English private water 
companies whose dividend payments seem to track the growth of company debt can be 
interpreted as representative of this extractive model of private ownership. 
5 Outcomes of public ownership 
5.1 Bills and environmental performance 
A central question was whether evidence supported the contention that POECs lead to lower 
bills and/or higher environmental standards. Examples of both effects were presented within 
mixed public/private markets. Robin Hood Energy’s fuel poverty tariff was credited with 
lowering bills in the East Midlands. Hamburg Energie had made significant investment in 
renewable electricity generation in the city. Econometric evidence was also presented, showing 
the presence of publicly owned companies in European electricity markets correlated with 
progress in decarbonisation.  
However, it was also noted that public ownership does not guarantee either high environmental 
performance or low bills, as POECs can have a variety of objectives. One German case of 
minority public ownership in a network company was discussed as having had very little impact 
on deployment of renewables. Historically, international evidence indicates POECs have been 
among the more polluting energy companies, with this being attributed particularly to public 
investment in low cost energy in developing countries. In Germany where limited district heating 
regulation leads to wide variation in prices, it was argued that some municipal companies levy 
high tariffs as a means of generating revenue for public budgets thus avoiding more visible tax 
rises.  
Some participants argued that the dominant paradigm for decarbonisation policy, based on 
governments incentivising commercial investment in low carbon energy, was a failure.6 These 
participants viewed  public ownership as a more effective alternative. There were, however, 
differences of opinion on whether an investment deficit for low carbon energy really exists, 
given the interplay between scaling up deployment, technological innovation and cost 
uncertainties. It was suggested that, while the UK government had made some mistakes in the 
past, it was becoming a more ‘intelligent procurer’ of low carbon electricity generation. For 
example competitive mechanisms such as auctions are now proving effective in reducing 
subsidies to support low carbon energy. The surprisingly low strike price for offshore wind in 
the most recent round of CfD auctions was cited in support of this position. A counter 
argument returned to the lower cost of capital available to public owners, meaning resources 
spent on incentivising investment would go further. It was also noted that around half of the 
UK’s offshore wind capacity is publicly owned (so potentially benefits from public financing), 
but by public authorities from other countries.  
5.2 Knowledge 
The concentration of technical and commercial knowledge about energy systems in private 
companies was argued to be detrimental to governments’ capacity to understand and shape 
energy system development. The public sector was described as having to go ‘cap in hand’ to 
private companies to access data and learning. Trade associations were also criticised for treating 
                                                 
6 For example, some participants noted the Trade Unions for Energy Democracy account of a global low carbon 
investment deficit http://unionsforenergydemocracy.org/resources/tued-publications/tued-working-paper-10/ 
 Workshop report: 2018 International  
workshop on public ownership of energy 
 9 
knowledge as private property to selectively pass on to public decision makers. POECs were 
argued to be more willing to share knowledge, contributing both to informing public debate on 
energy and to catalysing successful approaches. Robin Hood Energy was cited as a specific 
example of a POEC actively engaging with other public bodies keen to set up supply companies. 
The company was also exploring ways it could develop new knowledge resources, such as local 
fuel poverty maps, that would support its owner’s policy objectives. 
5.3 Industrial strategy 
It was suggested that greater public ownership would contribute to returning the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy to public control. In particular, it was argued, public ownership of 
energy infrastructure and assets would allow more effective steering of the economy. In addition 
POECs were suggested as a route to ‘on-shoring’ manufacturing and reduced reliance on 
imported energy system components. Low levels of UK manufacturing of offshore wind 
turbines was cited as an example which POECs could address through procurement policies, 
though there are some restrictions on the circumstances under which these would comply with 
EU rules.  
6 Conclusions 
The workshop highlighted the diversity of models for public ownership and an associated broad 
range of arguments for and against each. Feedback from workshop participants indicated the 
international scope of the workshop was beneficial in exposing this breadth, and one suggested 
line for further work was systematic mapping and comparative analysis of ownership models, 
both internationally and across UK local authorities.  
Complexity was a theme that ran through the workshop, leading to a suggestion that debate 
about public ownership would benefit from a ‘whole systems’ perspective encompassing 
interactions between policy, regulation, markets and infrastructure. Development of such a 
perspective is another area for future work. Linked to this could be development of new ‘system 
architecture’ proposals that would facilitate an effective role of new ownership models in 
delivering social and environmental policy objectives. Some participants underlined the 
importance of institutional and political analysis in making such proposals realistic. 
